Comparative Advantages | Keith Rabois, Managing Director at Khosla Ventures | Ep. 2

[00:00] All right, Keith, thanks a bunch for doing this. I appreciate you making time. Pleasure to be with you. I know you're busy. I know there's a lot of flying going on, and I'm committed to talking fast to keep up with you during this podcast. Ask the questions as slowly as you like. I will. Very fast, though. Okay, so the first thing I want to talk to you about is the whole idea of investing in outliers. And I saw you recently talk about something that resonated with me where you're like, you know, the top 15 basis points of people. Those are the founders that like make the companies that matter both to the world, probably also like to venture returns. [00:30] a very early stage pre-product market fit investor. And maybe to put a little bit more context around it, we all kind of know what like great looks like when you meet like a fully developed founder like the Collisons or Brian Chesky like today. Like I think anybody could walk into the room with them and be like, this person's amazing. But you operate for the most part at the very early stages. And so just talk to me about like what makes great? Like how do you know what great is at those early stages? Like what's inside your brain as you're like saying that talking about pre-product market fit investing? [01:00] be a pre-product market investor is very few people can do it. So like, as you point out, as companies grow up as [01:06] founders mature, [01:07] Many, many investors can figure out these people are excellent. This company is excellent. The P&L is amazing, et cetera. So in venture, the returns are mediocre across the venture industry. So the only way to produce... [01:20] great returns that are impressive to LP is, is you have to have an alpha. You have to have a comparative advantage, competitive advantage of some sort. And so mine is to find founders when they have nothing but a keynote deck, because there is nothing else for people to go on. There's no other, there's not maybe even a product. They can't even look at the product. There's almost really not product metrics and absolutely not financial metrics. So I think this is the most amazing thing for me, because what other investors do except throw up their

[01:50] there's no competition. Truthfully, there's virtually no competition on a keynote deck and founders for undiscovered founders. Once you've created, you know, X billion dollar company, you're going to start your next company. Sure, there's competition. You're going to start another company. I'm sure there'll be competition to invest in your round. But you're talking about people starting their first company from scratch and they just have a keynote deck and a co-founder. That's awesome because almost nobody else wants to do what I do. So then the question is, can you do it well? Like it's kind of like you have to be contrarian to right, not just bet on people, [02:20] a reasonable fraction in an early stage investing, call 40%. 40% is pretty much Hall of Fame, Ted Williams kind of stuff, if you can be that accurate. So then the question is, what are you looking for? And to me, the best I can describe it is, every founder that really succeeds has a superpower. And that superpower is something like, they're in the top one to 10 basis points in the world on some trait. So they're the most tenacious person you've ever met in your life. They're the most disciplined person you've ever met. They're the smartest person. [02:50] greatest salesperson. [02:51] It can be anyone, but they have to have a trait. And it has to match the company. It ideally matches the company. If you can match it to the company, then it's like so set up for success. That's like, please take my money right now. You know, do not pass go. Don't meet with my partners. Here's the jack. Yeah. Yeah. If it's just the trait without necessarily directly matching the company, it's still probably a pretty good investment. Actually, it's like how many dollars at what price? But if it absolutely matches 100%, like lean in, lean in, lean in.

[03:21] is a Venn diagram overlap that you never see. I'll give you a couple of examples. Two traits that don't usually go together in people. So I remember, [03:28] when i first started working with max love chain in late 2000 um reed hoffman said to me [03:34] to prepare me for my first one-on-one meeting with Max, that Max is a world-class technologist and a world-class strategy, business strategist. And he's like, there's five of those people who are less than all of Silicon Valley. And this is amazing. This is December of 2000. So before Max was famous, before PayPal was successful, we were a complete mess. But Reid exactly nailed Max's combination of superpowers. Those two traits don't go together. Jack Dorsey, another very successful founder. Jack actually can do three. He's actually a pretty good technologist. He's a [04:04] world-class design taste, and he's a very strong business strategist. So that you marry three traits that don't go together. That's another reason to invest. But those are the only two, in my experience, is like, you have to have that. If you think about it, it's even globalized this. It's not about founders. It's about anybody who succeeds in a competitive industry. You're a professional athlete. You want to be the best NBA player of all time. You almost surely have some abilities, some traits, some body composition that's very different. [04:34] Donald Trump has been elected president of the United States twice despite a lot of people hating him because he has superpowers and you can actually I've spent the last couple years trying to isolate his superpowers because I was like I want to understand like why does he keep winning despite the world so that I think there's two one is he understands marketing and that's easy to say but very rare and I'll give you an illustration a very specific illustration Trump actually cares about what his supporters look like now that sounds crazy if you think about politics you're like wait why do I care what my supporters look like but then if you turn turn both

[05:04] our brains on our marketing [05:06] If we're gonna cut a commercial for any one of our companies, if Nike was gonna cut a commercial for some new product, would they care what the athletes in the commercial look like? Of course they would. So Trump has instincts about what central casting looks like and how that becomes aspirational for other people, and he just applies that to politics. And no other politician I've ever met has been that strong and that instinctive, and it pays dividends. Is it instincts, or do you think he could articulate? [05:36] specific about, oh, you need to, you know, you look great, do this, this, I need more supporters that look like you. But when you think about it, like, of course, if we were launching a consumer product, that's the first thing we would think, like, if we were going to have a product hero shop, like, if I was promoting this sweater, if I was, like, promoting my Jack Archer brand pants, of course, I would care. [05:54] What's the model? What age is the model? You know, even sometimes nationality and race, like all these things go into any marketing campaign that any company in Silicon Valley uses. He just applies to politics. The second thing, and this explains some of his partnership with Elon, is he just asked a lot of why questions. Why, why, why? And most people in politics don't. There's a consensus in politics that this is the way you do things. This is the way you set a budget. This is the way you do. And he just doesn't accept that. So he keeps probing like, why? Well, why do we have this deal? You know, why do we pay this money to these people? [06:24] Why, why, why, why, why? And usually the answers aren't that great. That's like a key hallmark of like a beginner's mind, I feel like, because the people who just keep asking. And they ask it six times. So what makes Elon exceptional is it's not the one or two levels of why. It's like why, why, why, why, why, why? And so you get deep to the quote unquote metal. And usually as you do, you find out that

[06:41] there's some mistakes or some things that can be better. And not always. Sometimes there's a Darwinistic evolution of really good ideas and they're sound. But I bet you in politics, that's less than half the time. And so what Trump's very good at is, and this is unsettling to a lot of people who've made their career in politics, is unsettling the people who've built this consensus. And as he probes, he's like, [07:02] you know what, this makes no sense. And then, then of course you have to find a better solution. And Elon's, you know, been phenomenal over 25, 30 years at finding better solutions. But the first thing is to find out what's wrong, what's broken, what can be better and why, and then try to build the solution. It's sort of interesting because I always felt like during Lattice, I was like, it's weird how we're like pretty mechanical and we try to really inspect all these other things. But then when it comes to hiring, it's just like people take this pass, like, I like the guy, you know, this felt [07:32] You know, like I like their vibe. Like I feel good about them. And it's sort of like most people think they're a better than average driver. I would think most people think they're a better than average picker of people. Yeah, most people are much worse. Not many. Right. Most people are much worse. Your brother happens to be really good at it. Right. But there's very few people. I actually think about, I've thought about, you know, I've been in venture and in tech, I guess, combined for 25 years now. And so I've met a lot of people because when I started my career, a lot of people who built Silicon Valley were kind of at the end of their career.

[08:02] their career and now through the people in the beginning of theirs. I can count on like one hand, the number of people who consistently can identify founder talent from the very beginning. Yeah. And your brother's one of them. He definitely is. And I feel like, well, and you are too. I mean, you've done it many times. And I feel like so often the lack of willingness or ability to get specific with understanding this thing that is like sort of like the center of the venture craft. And it's just like, I'm going to go off my feelings. And [08:32] more and more professionally, obviously, is how do you go from this feels good, I'm trusting my instincts to being really excellent. You kind of talked about like, are they really world class and excellent at something, but maybe to like make it concrete, you and Vinod obviously have both, you know, this is two people who really know what they're doing on this. When you guys both meet a founder, and you know, you're trying to decide if this person was good or great, like, what is some of the language you use to sort of like, what is your discussion? Like, how do you talk about, [09:02] It's a great question because Vinod is actually two things and one of the reasons why he's been so extraordinary. He's a technology investor and a people founder investor and that's rare. He understands the implications of new technologies better than most and so he can make technology-driven investments too. I can't do that. I don't wake up in the morning and read about some new technology and say, "Oh my God, I'm going to go find five companies." You don't even try that? No, no, no, no, because there's so many people that are better than me at seeing a new technology and figuring out all the implications to it.

[09:32] Vinod is extraordinary at that. Someone like Marc Andreessen is probably pretty good at that. That can be a great way to be an investor if you're better than other people at understanding technology breakthroughs and what the implications are. Can I ask one more quick question? Do you need to be afraid of not understanding a market then? Or are you just like, I'm just going to be horse blinders if this person's amazing. I don't care what this market is. Yeah, I will learn along the way. [09:54] I think it's kind of interesting. At least let's divide venture investing into three components. [10:02] sort of thing. There's definitely the assessment evaluating. There's the winning because some things are competitive, some things aren't actually. And then there's the, can you increase the probabilities of success or the amplitude of success by being like a consigliere? I think in areas I know better, I actually can probably help more on the consigliere piece, like financial services, payments, whatever. I can probably be more useful to a founder after I start working with them because I've seen where a lot of bodies are buried. I've tried a lot of things by hand. [10:32] a consigliere, do you think that's basically all that matters from a VC to help a company, or do you believe in some of the other stuff too? I think for the best founders, being a consigliere is like 99% of the value. So when I pitch a really world-class founder, I'm like, why take my money? It's me as a partner. It's like, yeah, I'm going to be someone when everything's a mess, who can give you feedback that occasionally is useful. And the really best founders actually ask for conceptual frameworks, not answers. So like, for example, my friend Max Rhodes at FAIR,

[11:02] Why do you have a conceptual framework for navigating that? And you know, the answer is sometimes yes. Or like someone I remember when I first started working with Patrick Coulson in 2013 or so, we would sit down for brunch on a Sunday and he'd come with a list of five to 10 questions. And I would go to bed really early the night before to make sure I was very well rested. I'd be like in bed by nine o'clock because I knew he's going to only ask the questions that he was like debating or struggling with. Because if there were easy answers, he would already executed them and they would never raise them. [11:32] thing, like hysterically, because I'd be like, "Oh my God, I can't wait to see what's next," because they're increasing the level of difficulty. But on the five or six, if I could make his eyes light up twice, it'd be like the most home run meeting ever. It's like coaching Steph Curry. You know, like Steph Curry knows what he's doing. He's very good at what he does. But a coach can still help. A coach can occasionally light up and allow the person to reflect on it. So I think that's what the real goal is, is to be a good consigliere. And sometimes I describe it by metaphors like [12:02] doing is exaggerating the positives or the negatives and playing it back because like the forest and trees kind of thing so i'm exaggerating what i see and saying is this which really what you want it's trying to stay in this little eddy of the conversation but do you think that [12:16] your experience as a COO where you did that kind of work with founders was actually more aligned to being a VC in some ways than being a CEO? Yes, I think so. I think because I never really want to be the visionary. [12:27] for the most part, and I'm mostly trying to help someone execute their vision. So you don't have this proverbial conflict. Like when I first entered venture, people like had this, you know, kind of concern that people talk about when successful executives become PCs that they're going to try to control. And it's like, if you're a COO, you've never really been in control. You never wanted to be in control. Like I partnered with someone like Jack Dorsey, or I partnered with someone like Reid Hoffman, or I partnered with someone like Max Levchin, or Peter Thiel.

[12:57] - Yeah, it actually is a good proxy. And you know, I hadn't really double clicked on this, but as you think about hiring for here, if we do hire ex-execs, I think it's better, possibly better to hire the number twos than the number one. Because you don't really want to ever get in the way of a founder's vision, at least in my view. Like when I choose to invest in a founder, it's because I believe this person, [13:19] is compelling. [13:20] has these traits and will be the CEO forever. Or as long as their health, their family, whatever their obligations will allow for, or I won't invest personally. As a fund, other partners here may invest where they think we're going to change the CEO at some point. We do a lot of deep tech investing. Some of the deep tech emerges from universities. Not all of those professors want to be a CEO of a large organization forever. So we do have, a reasonable number of our portfolio companies where we do change and add a CEO, but that's not [13:50] I will not be the cheerleader or the point person for those kind of investments. Back to where you started though, actually, interestingly enough, Vinod and I have worked [13:58] as VCs for seven years now, just over seven, and he was also on my board at Square. [14:04] Interestingly enough, I don't know if we've ever really disagreed about a founder's ability. Maybe shades of grades between like maybe I grade A plus and he'd say A. And is that because you both read it the same at the outset or do you talk it through? Do you still, even when you're similar, do you talk about it? We do discuss it, but it's interesting just generally what happens on like a partner presentation level is a company will come in, present, and there'll be the five MDs here plus

[14:34] you know, founder finishes, we'll discuss, like should we invest and why? No, no, I have had very different opinions on whether we should invest at what terms or what price, you know, in which companies. But I can't recall a specific founder where we didn't have the same reaction, which is really fascinating, 'cause like seven years times, partner meetings, 50 weeks a year, [14:52] hundreds. [14:54] Whereas I definitely can remember very specific illustrations with some of my partners like Samir, who's a very good investor, or David Wyden, who's a very good investor, where we did grade very differently. And one of us might have been right, the other one might have been right. But interestingly enough, they seem to have the same constellation of assessment. I guess maybe the last thing I would be interested to tease apart is... [15:17] Besides this concept of we got to find the thing they're world class at, is there any other is there anything else that's happening, concluding at the same read as Vinod? On the founder level, no. But then we may discuss like the market opportunity, the business opportunity, the angle, the initial entry point. Because like usually inertia is the worst thing for a startup early stage. Right. The world doesn't like you, doesn't think it needs you. And you've got to invert that. Like you remember this at Lattice, like you have to create momentum from scratch. [15:47] the founder does is invert inertia, literally in a physical sense. The rest stays around, body rest stays at rest. You've got to create the momentum and you have limited time, limited energy, capital, people to do that. [16:00] Those kind of discussions, Vinod and I certainly can have different views about. Like, "Oh, this market makes a lot of sense," or, "He may see an angle to enter a market that's better than what I would do, or more insightful, or where I'm actually struggling with an answer," or vice versa. Or, "I may believe in this current founder, their approach actually will pay dividends and he might not see it." But, if you believe in the founder, for reasonable size investment, that can still make sense. So, let's say,

[16:26] I brought in a founder tomorrow that Vinod thought was stellar, but he thought the market was stupid or the approach was dumb. For $2 million, we'd almost surely still invest. For $10 million, we might not. And for $20 million, we almost surely wouldn't. So it depends on the size of investment, how much you can just go with the founder's right, [16:48] they're great, they're going to figure this out. Versus there's line of sight to something that seems interesting. I want to talk about decision making now more generally, which on some level, like a VC firm is just like it. The whole product is decision making on some level. At Founders Fund, I've seen people talk about how decisions often will get bubbled up from junior people or how you have to like a $1 million check, a $5 million, a $10, et cetera. And whatever it is, there's a way that decisions happen there. There's some way it happens at Khostla. First, I'm curious about [17:18] Thank you. [17:19] you know, if you could talk about a little bit of those differences, but then maybe at a more fundamental level, like how important is the way venture funds make decisions? Like, is that a very important part of, you know, a venture capital firm's activities? Or is it just sort of like a an auxiliary thing, but it's not really like the main show? Well, I think the biggest difference between like, let's call it sales is, you know, sales to some extent, you want all your customers, right? Like in a target market, you want as many customers as possible. Assessing or

[17:49] - For a fund that can win enough good opportunities. - A fund that has a good deal flow, I would say. Let's just eliminate the sourcing. - Assuming you see and can win stuff. - Assuming you see and can win stuff. - Then it's about decision making. And let's put it this way, when I have sleepless nights, [18:03] They're 90% about work and 10% everything else in my life. They're mostly about making the wrong call. And I've talked about a few of them publicly on podcasts where, you know, X versus Y. And then I could lose sleep for a decade. And you worry more about bad passes? Well, you try to... [18:20] Um, [18:21] figure out why. [18:22] So you don't replicate the mistakes. Let me give you a tangible example to talk about publicly because it is one where rarely I made a mistake and was able to learn from the mistake and then apply it to a second company. I've talked about this previously. I had basically assigned term sheet to lead the seed round for Robinhood. And they came back to me after we had at least a handshake, maybe a signed term sheet and said, would you we want you to join the board? And this is like about my first year as a VC. So I didn't have like as much authority myself. So I went back to my partnership and we had a discussion. [18:52] discussion about should I join the board? And the answer is no, internally, which makes sense. You literally add a VC like KB or any competitor of ours, you can't join the board for every seed company. So I went back and said, I can't do this. I'm sorry. And they're like, well, we really want to make other choices then because you won't be as involved and whether or not, good decision. Anyway, so run up non-investing. Dang. [19:14] three years ago and obviously probably not nearly well stuff um so all i would have done is mess it up probably but in any event you know with hindsight like an insanely good decision yeah two million at 20 post or something okay so yeah like listen we don't have to lose honestly

[19:30] we can look it up after that yeah in any event two two three years goes by [19:34] And my friends at FAIR are raising a seed round. Jeff and Max had worked for me at Square. You know, they were entering YC, so they were getting some attention. It obviously was set up for me to lead the seed round, but they came back with the same condition. You must join them all. Mm-hmm. [19:51] And I'm like, hmm, I've got burned this one before. So what I did is, and now the statute of limitations has passed, I said yes without consulting my partners. I'm just like, I'm not going to tell anybody, I'm just going to join the board. And so it turns out to have been a very wise decision. And like the rationale for actually not telling my partners was obviously I got burned before, but like, [20:09] you know, like I try to be intellectually honest with my partners here. That's why we have a great relationship and we all work well together and it's based upon trust is Max and Jeff were close friends of mine. We were soccer buddies before Square, worked at Square. I was like, they're going to text me 24 seven whenever they want. I'm going to meet with them whenever they want. So the incremental joining the board for them is like meaningless. And so I really felt that intellectually, honestly, that, you know, I'm going to meet Max asked for a meeting on Sunday. I'm going to meet with him on Sunday. He calls me Monday night at 10 p.m. I'm definitely going to [20:39] you know, talk to them. So there was no real drag coefficient in terms of effort, where typically a board member, there is more. So I felt like, you know, I'm just going to do this. And then, of course, it's worked out well, the company's great, you know, very happy. And everybody here is very happy. But it's rare when you can take the very specific lesson and apply it and not make the same mistake. But so basically, your kind of view is once you get past, you know, a threshold where relative to your fund size, you see enough, you can win enough, decision making

[21:09] that [21:10] we should have done here. It's a very [21:12] well-regarded private company called three to five billion on paper, um, where we had a relationship with the founder from his prior life and we collectively decided not to, not to invest. And then we recently, it's about five years ago, I was here at the time and we were recently talking about how did we miss this? Cause they came in and presented it and, [21:32] for whatever sort of reasons, we didn't, [21:34] We didn't invest. So we actually pulled up our partner meeting notes from like 2018 and read them to see like, what did we do wrong? Why did we miss this? And, you know, so we tried to learn from poor decisions if we can. [21:51] When you're meeting some of these early stage things, like a lot of times you like, you know, on one end of the spectrum, there's what you just described it fair. Like, these are your friends. You like, you're sure they're good. There's a lot of other situations where you just like don't have the time where like a deal is moving quickly. It like looks pretty good, but you're not 100 percent sure. In my head, what I assume is you must have some gradient where you've got some deals where, you know, whether it's ramp or fair the day you do it, you're like, I know this is good. And then you must have some deals where the day you do it, you're like, I'm actually like just genuinely not sure. [22:21] You mentioned before that 40% is a stellar hit rate. Do you think of your job as a function of, "I need to do a certain cross-section of these very sure and not so sure things no matter what?" Or if you had a smaller fund, would you only do the things you were very sure about and then you have to move down the stack as a result of the situation you're in? How do you think about this? I think it's a fascinating question.

[22:44] 90% of the best stuff I've ever invested in as an angel or as a VC, I was dead sure of. So I think the implication to that is if the fund were smaller, if you had less money or less time. If you ran a $100 million seed fund, would you? I would probably only go for the pretty damn sure. So like for example, when I think Lonsdale has told this story publicly that when they started Palantir, I was the only person who thought it was a good idea. Literally other than the four co-founders. I was like, this is so smart. [23:10] like boom airbnb like instantly yeah and i'll tell you like i three minute after his monologue three minutes in i was like [23:16] This is the coolest thing. Which by the way, that's a good example of a hard one that a lot of really smart people passed on. Everybody else was totally wrong. There were people who thought they were cool, interesting founders like Paul Graham talks about this publicly, but nobody else thought it was a good idea. I was like, no, literally this is the coolest thing since YouTube. And I was like, three minutes after, I was like, we need to, we, Kevin Hart, Javan and I need to invest now. So I knew it right away. YouTube literally took like less than the barbecue where I found out about it. Like Javan actually literally walked me into his bedroom to show me every video at the time, literally every video that was uploaded to YouTube. And I was like, [23:46] I want to invest right now. Like, [23:48] Period. So like usually like I've had that instinct of like, wow, at the time for the really, really best stuff. Have you ever gotten shocked by something that you were good that turned out to be amazing? Occasionally, but then obviously didn't think it was that not good because I wouldn't have invested. Maybe ask differently if you looked at your whole if every day that you invested, if you said, OK, put the the day you wired the money, put this in a quartile for yourself. Do you think that you would accurately predict how good each basket was? Mostly, yes. Or at least barbell wise, like the top stuff. Yes.

[24:18] And then would there be some stuff actually, maybe at the tail, that would surprise you? So that would be a little bit interesting to actually study. Like actually force the discipline of ranking one to 10. Like how good is this on day one? And then five to 10 years later, looking at the stuff that really had high conviction. Ramp was a very high conviction, instant, like they, [24:39] started projecting their notes and you know DAC just notes in like a couple of minutes and I was like in total sales mode like instantly like boom same thing I'll tell you a funny story about this company most people don't know but it's really phenomenal in uh in Europe called Trade Republic it's like a better version of Robin Hood but for Europe [24:58] And it's phenomenally [25:00] great company, but I didn't even want to take the meeting. I was like, "Europe, Robin Hood for Europe, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah." So my colleague at Founders Fund, Matthias, found this company in Berlin. And he's like, "You need to meet them." And I kept trying to avoid it, like literally, "Do I really have to do this?" You know, kind of thing. And anyway, we sit down at this conference room in Founders Fund in February, March 2019. And founder Christian sits over there and three slides in, [25:26] I was like, oh my God, this is the coolest thing ever. And so I went the rest of the meeting in full sales mode. [25:32] Like full, like, yeah, you know, I can help with this and this and this and this. I'll connect the dots. I walk out of the meeting. And so I'd only been a founder's fund for about a month. You walk out of the meeting and like Matias kind of taps me on the shoulder. He's like, what happened to you? And I'm like, what are you talking about? He's like, you didn't even want to take this meeting. And like, you're in love with this thing. I was like, you just found the best founder in the history of Europe. Wow. And I knew like three slides in.

[25:53] And he will be the best founder in the history of Europe. Wow, that's crazy. Yeah, I mean, as I'm listening to this, what was going through my head was connecting back to, you know, as an individual investor, you have some comparative advantage and you just need to like, [26:08] get yourself into that zone of genius as often as possible. And what I was thinking about is like, as a fund shape, you also have comparative advantages. And so like, you know, as I, as we were talking about that, I was thinking, well, it's actually in some ways a comparative, there's a disadvantage that comes from being large, which is that like, you know, you just, you've got some constraints. And so like, you know, that would say maybe to me as a smaller fund manager, I should, you know, what I would take away from this conversation is just like, act when you have more confidence, you must have some huge advantages from being like being a big [26:38] is like the comparative advantages, not from you as an investor, but from KOSLA as an entity and the size. So let's talk about I'll give you a really concrete one, which is related to AI, which is very important topic. I am certainly not a master of AI. Um... [26:50] non-AI investor per se. Since I've come back to KV, I've made two and a half like significant AI based investments. And the only reason I had conviction and confidence to pull the trigger on two of them was we at KV are very expert at AI. I have like these three partners here who know AI really cold, Vinod, Sven, and John Chu. And so what I feel I can do is if I find a founder who's in the

[27:20] then get air cover from my technical colleagues, Vinod, Sven, and John, who know AI, and can ensure that this product is differentiated, that this is the best approach to solving this [27:32] product space through AI and that there's nothing better out there. Two of the companies I invested in, I never would have been able to, with high conviction, lead a meaningful round. I might have led a seed round, but I definitely would have led a series A or B without [27:47] without John's fan and Vinod's involvement. So I get the leverage. Same thing in health. Like we have some people here really understand digital pharmaceutical and, you know, actual all versions of health care. And so if I find something interesting in health, I run it by one or two of my colleagues. And then I can still apply my normal Keith, is this founder amazing? But I also know I'm not making a mistake. Sean McGuire, when we just did a podcast the other day, just said something that really resonated with me on this, which was basically the analogy was that, you know, [28:17] it. [28:17] 98th percentile, you can't tell the difference between 99 and 99.5. You can't tell the difference between people above you. But if you're 99.9, you can tell the difference between people below you. And I thought that was really interesting. And this would be the equivalent is like, you would know like a, you know, in AI, you might know like a charlatan from a reasonable person when you see it, but you wouldn't know world class. Right. Exactly. Very good. So even when we post investment, one of the areas we do add value at KV on AI companies is people are building out AI teams. They need their first leader of a true AI leader to build out, you know, an AI function. [28:47] I can't do that. [28:48] Like, I don't know how to assess, like, is this really the right person? I can look at, you know, some credentials and things like that and triangulate, seems directly right, direction wrong. But if this is a really important company for us, I will have either Sven or John or Renaud interview the candidate and then therefore get the benefits of both because they can grade 99.9, 99.5, 99, 98, where I can't. Are you able to use the fund size itself to your advantage, too, in any cases?

[29:18] size to an advantage in a very effective way. There's other things where some funds are, you know, not doing these sort of like we do premium assets and that's the end of the story. I've seen others using, you know, their fund size to do like new products and offerings and things like that. But I'm curious if you experience the relatively larger fund as an advantage directly. Yeah, the way we think about it at KV where there is a real advantage is because we like to back bold investments [29:43] bold ideas, ambitious founders, [29:46] and really early. [29:48] is not all the things we invest in are going to move to being appreciated by the consensus. So you can take it through multiple rounds? We can take it through multiple rounds until you want to have an affliction. Like this is a good Peter Thiel point is you don't want to stay contrarian forever. To be really successful, eventually you need consensus that this is a good product, good thing to adopt, good thing to pay for. So you want to convert contrarian to consensus and then take advantage of that momentum. That in-between step, [30:16] There may not be investors [30:18] that really appreciate you until you get somewhere down that curve. So having a fair amount of capital, if we have conviction about the opportunity that's better or as good as when we first led, we have conviction about the founder and the team that's as good or better than when we first made an investment, we can double down, triple down. Now, at some point, we're going to want you to prove that there's a real there, that the world wants this. Eventually, you have to get to the world definitely will want this and appreciate it. And then other people's money is great.

[30:48] - It also aligns to you guys doing more hard tech investments. - Yeah, deep tech. The milestones are different. The milestones that other people, that financial investors can appreciate, are going to be further out. So you need to be able to fund or be able to partner with people that have the same criteria, which is a skill in and of itself. Knowing who to partner with to finance a certain type of round. - Totally, yeah. Do you worry, just broadly speaking, about venture as an ecosystem or asset class as things have gotten so... There's so much money now. [31:18] running Lattice during Zerp times. We had all these crossover funds, they kind of went away, but now the sort of blue chip funds are big. And there's I think more dollars coming in than out of venture for a while now. Does this give you any anxiety? Do you think this is a problem? - Well, it could be a problem. I think there is a scarce number of founders who have the traits that can build an iconic company. That's the scarcest thing. - Founders is the scarcity. - Scarcity. Now, what's interesting in AI world is [31:45] for any given company, they may be more capital intensive. So you could... [31:50] say there's still going to be 15 companies and 15 founders in any given time frame that have high potential but the consumption of capital at open ai yeah is off the charts definitely and doesn't it doesn't mean it's bad but if ai companies have that pattern then a lot of venture capital can still funnel into the barrels the proverbial barrels as founders do you think that the like application layer where a lot of this investing is happening now outside of the models

[32:20] It should be moderately low, in theory. That's what it seems like it should be. And I often will meet these companies that raised a seed and now they're profitable and everything's fine. But then I'll see a lot of the current sort of leading app layer companies have all actually raised quite a lot of money. And so I'm not sure what's going to end up happening. Because they will have more competition from each other. So I can't quite tell how it's going to play out. Yeah, I think at the application layer, it's dangerous to raise too much capital. I think there's reasons why at the foundation level, model innovation or things that are closer to that infrastructure layer. [32:49] there's real good reasons. Founders walk in and ask us for 30, 50 million dollars. And before AI, we would say no, and we'd say that's totally unreasonable. But then the AI founders at the foundation level have really good reasons why it's like, "I actually need to spend 30 million dollars, or I can't get to this milestone." And so we definitely have to think about it. And therefore, we have written a lot of those checks in AI. But then what happens, I think there's a distortion at the application layer is they read about their competitors or colleagues or whatever friends [33:19] and so they walk in like, I want $50 million because so-and-so over here. But they're very different businesses, even though they both have valuable AI on them. I mean, one of the interesting things that this connects to – [33:29] You know, we talked about you need to be contrarian, right? It's obviously sort of like how money is typically made. I think there is sort of an unspoken prevailing wisdom right now or prevailing thought right now, I should say, that we might be in a moment where you can be consensus and right in a lot of areas. And a lot of people are behaving as though that's true. And so like the way that I see that expressed is there's a lot of ideas that make a lot of sense. You take AI times whatever industry times, pick a vertical, pick like a department at a company horizontally, whatever. There should be something in X.

[33:59] on one and a lot of people that make the bet a lot of companies are now competing for you know those verticals i think that's part of probably why people end up raising a lot of money is because they're in this like you know 11 horse race for something that seems consensus and right do you think that uh it's possible to have moments in time where there's a lot of money to be made in consensus right things or is that a mirage in the history of venture capital there's usually these three-year windows where that's true like the first three years the internet there are there [34:29] is knowing [34:31] the valuation, your entry price really matters. So you need to be right, but you also need to get paid correctly for the risk you're taking on. And so the problem is if you treat all AI companies like they're foundational model companies or robotics or something, even if you pick a really good company in a vertical-- - It might not be a $10 billion company. - Yeah, you may not make that much money. Like you enter at $400 million, it's a $2 billion company. You know, it's not terrible, but it's not gonna return, it's not gonna return a fund. - Yeah. - And so you have to be disciplined about, [34:59] the price to especially series b and up maybe an a plus or minus you get it right it's probably good enough c definitely make the right call companies epic you know it's not it's not going to really matter but i do think that the discipline about [35:14] will pay 100 million post or whatever versus 200 million does matter in the consensus right world. Is your instinct that we are in one of those three-year windows right now? I think the vertical, I think you can apply AI successfully to a lot of verticals. And whether it's [35:29] Hardcore AI there's like versions of AI like how innovative it is it but the demand for intelligent acts that replaces human errors or human costs or human scalability issues. Those are the three biggest ones is very real because humans do make mistakes. They are expensive and they're hard to scale. Okay, I want to go over to tech and the government and politics and sort of like this sort of new moment in time we're in that I think is extremely interesting. I would say outside of AI the other place that has a lot of like

[35:59] heat and excitement is like deep tech, which is great, I think. A lot of this probably is related to the fact that, you know, tech and the government are involved. Some of it, the causality arrow goes both ways here, of course. And as these companies have gotten more important, the government's taking more notice. So maybe before we get into some of the specific questions, tech and the government are like friends all of a sudden, and there's like a relationship now. What's most surprising to me in some ways is that like that didn't exist over the last 10 years. It's not like tech was some underdog for the last 10 years. So I guess what is, [36:29] so dramatically. You could say it's an administration or whatever, but why are we in this situation now where tech all of a sudden has this, not just a voice, but a loud voice? I think there's two reasons. One of them may be less negative than the other. The first one is, at the end of the day, [36:46] The Democratic Party of the United States for the last 15 years, [36:49] basically has penalized and stigmatized successful people. Just read your average Bernie Sanders speech. [36:54] that's the representative voice of the Democrats is if you're successful, you've stolen money from someone like Robert, Robert Reich, who used to be labor secretary, you know, posted like basically a simplified version of this last week is like, basically the only way to be a billionaire is to steal money from people inside of trading or inherited, which is obviously completely false, but that's the prevailing view in the democratic party. Paul Graham wrote that essay that was like how people get rich. And it's like, that's not how any of you know, of course, like none of the people we, none of the people we know, like literally none of the people we know, like Vinod came over here with like $40, like from India. [37:24] Like literally he couldn't afford to eat anything except McDonald's. You know, so like that's how people get rich in the United States more often than not. In Europe, you still have to like follow one of these formulas actually. Interesting enough. But in any event, there's a lot of excitement in tech because no longer are people who are building stuff and creating value for the world and transforming the world in positive directions being demonized. And so I think that is a very refreshing, you know, change. And so that's that's positive.

[37:54] in bias against [37:56] let's say, conservatives and conservative ideas and spending a lot of time, money demonizing conservatives and conservative ideas and Trump particularly. And so I think a lot of people are on their apology tour. Like, you know, Mark Zuckerberg spent $400 million promoting Biden. Arguably, it was more important in electing Biden than any other person. Reid Hoffman, it's not even public, like how much money. So there's a lot of people who have business interests that you just can't be that one side in the politics. Like no Fortune 500 company in history has ever been that biased. Google, like 98 percent, I think, of all employees [38:26] Democrats. So a lot of this is like, oh, we need to get back to closer to equilibrium because it's just not going to work out well for us to be so partisan. So that dialing back is definitely driving a lot of this too. So now that the relationship is closer, what's going to like change for tech companies? Like there's so many of these companies, some of them, the most important companies we've talked about, but you know, like Android, SpaceX, OpenAI, like Airbnb, to some extent, like a lot of these most very important companies, [38:56] local, state, federal, but like kind of the more important the company is, the more the government seems to matter. Well, what's happened in the last 30, maybe 50 years in the United States is more of what you do in your life. [39:06] is dictated or [39:08] constrained by law and regulation. It's just like over the last hundred years, it's hard to do a lot of things. You're basically suffocated by law and regulation. So any company needs to navigate that. And sometimes you're right, it's much more local than federal. And sometimes it's much more federal than local. But you're going to see tech companies having to navigate a world that is just more constrained. And navigating through a constrained world actually can be very opportunistic. One of

[39:38] like investing in heavily regulated spaces is having been a lawyer, I feel like I can kind of in my own brain do the [39:45] probabilistic assessment of risk reward. And most other VCs kind of have to outsource it to like some lawyers. And so I like heavily regulated spaces. But I think the world, it's interesting enough, I know, you know, you've been talking publicly about having kids and stuff. But the only thing you can do in the United States without like the government's permission is have a kid. Like there's literally almost nothing else you're allowed to do. It's actually shocking when you have your kids like it's like, oh, I didn't even need permission. [40:07] in some ways, [40:08] the situation that we have now with the government is like almost all positive for tech. I wonder, are there risks to being this close? Like in some ways we were kind of just like la-di-da, we're over here in Silicon Valley or, you know, wherever we are, we're doing our thing. The government's just like not thinking about us. And now it's extremely spotlighted. You know, it's like at the inauguration, it's like, whoa. Yeah. Everybody's there. Trump's talking about it. Is this perilous in any way? Oh, I think it is actually. I think it's not accidental that, you know, [40:34] Silicon Valley is about as geographically distanced from D.C. as possible. And, you know, it's like a feature, not a bug. Yeah. So I think innovation and cleverness and disruptive thought in some contrarian, you know, ideas. [40:49] are better and more fertile in areas that are not touched by the government. It's like the government wouldn't know how to regulate crypto or AI in the nascent days. And the closer you are, I would imagine it's like the sooner they're going to want to be involved with a lot of these things. And I worry that that kind of regulation early is very stifling. It's very stifling. And also, there's things like you study in political science about regulatory capture. Incomments can use the government more easily than a startup can. So if you have a disruptive technology to some inclement, it's more likely the

[41:19] the larger institutions are going to take advantage of government access to curtail your opportunity. So it's very I think it is very dangerous. A lot of these VC firms now, it's not just like, you know, there's like some like middle person, like a lot of the it's not like a consigliere in the middle. There's like the VC firm now has people in DC that are powerful. And at the same time, a lot of these, these, you know, same VC firms have gotten very large, gotten very influential. Do you think that this leads to these firms transforming or playing a different looking role? [41:49] or will they still just be VC firms that like have a deep connection to the government the way that like JP Morgan always has or something like that? I think, you know, Goldman Sachs always has like as a classic example. And so I think maybe VCs or some VCs, you know, adopt that as a differentiation or point of differentiation or, you know, a feature part of their feature set sort of thing. We'll see how that plays out, because, again, I don't know if it's the best thing for early stage companies. So, for example, yeah, some like the next andurals where your target customer is the federal government. [42:19] like by far, then sure, early investment in politics, politics makes sense. For most companies, it's probably not great. So for example, when I'm in DC, people always ask me, what do you think about DC? [42:31] I actually like DC. I used to live there as a lawyer. It's one of my favorite US cities, but it's kind of like junk food for me because the next early stage, 19 year old undiscovered talent is not hanging out in DC. The people that are hanging out in DC is, you know, I talked about a conference recently is you run into Mark Zuckerberg or Jensen. Like that's not useful for me as an early stage investor. It's interesting and fascinating, you know, and like maybe if I want to have an A one day, like a company, I'm not finding some undiscovered talent like in DC.

[43:01] So like you can get distracted with this junk food where I have to eat real meals, which, you know, great founders are probably everywhere else. Yeah, it's funny that like hanging out with Jensen or Zuck would be junk food for you. But when you say it in that light, I guess it really doesn't help you much. No, I need to find somebody who's never built anything before and has an idea about how to actually disrupt NVIDIA or Meta. [43:31] to anyway. Like I feel like there was a there was like a guardedness like even 10 years ago when I was like starting Lattice, I didn't feel like investors were like expressing their thoughts. And now I think a lot more investors and firms and people in general are willing online to just like say what they think kind of fearlessly. You say what you think kind of fearlessly. And even before it was cool. You did it before it was cool. Yeah, totally. But you definitely still do it now. You say a lot about politics. I mean, you definitely were always willing to like, [44:01] talking about politics for a long time too. - Not as much. - But I feel like lately you're really willing to like, you don't seem afraid to say what you think ever. - I think as a VC it's a little bit easier for one structural reason to remember from that is, when you run a large organization, you represent a huge constellation of people. So I don't think a CEO should really be engaged in politics, unless it affects the company. I'm kind of pretty strict about that. But as a VC you don't represent a large constellation of people. [44:23] You may only represent yourself or small partnership. You know, I have four MDs here. You have four colleagues for MDs. So it's a very small, insular group. So I think it's easier to express your voices. And then I think the culture has changed, though. You just watch Elon, you know, like, but I think he, as the best founder,

[44:40] you know, of the last hundred years. I think now it's like not debatable, but like, [44:44] as the most successful founder of the last 100 years, [44:48] as he's engaging in, you know, intellectual, it lets everybody do it. Yeah. It's such an example. Like we're just like, [44:54] Mark Zuckerberg sets an example for founders in some ways. Steve Jobs set an example. Everybody, Brian Chesky sets examples. I mean, Elon even set an example, not that he's better or anything like that, but he set an example for Zuck in some ways, it looks like to me. I think people like, you know, like emulating successful people in your field is a very common thing. Like if you're a great athlete, you look at like if you know you want to be if you want to be the next great basketball player, of course, you'd watch like Michael Jordan or Kobe Bryant, you know, etc. Or if you're, you know, seven foot, you'd watch like Shaq or Patrick Ewing and stuff like that. So I think it's very normal [45:24] And so as successful founders are more engaged in politics for their own reasons, I think that does create. [45:32] either you know a copycat mentality or a license to engage but i don't think typically it's great for a founder of a large organization to be taking views on issues that do not directly affect their company do you think it helps vcs it can i mean i think vc is interesting because it's a matchmaking exercise from my point about the consigliere like i am not the right partner for every founder even internally like sometimes someone will come to me [45:57] Like, it happened actually this morning, I met a founder. I think it's a good investment actually. I'm not sure I'm the best partner for him, but I think it's a good investment. So what I'm gonna try to do is pair him with a different one of my partners, who I think would be probably better for him. And so there's always this matchmaking exercise. So I think,

[46:12] it's fair for founders to know who you're partnering with. You're partnering for a very long time, decade, etc. And does this person share either values or an approach to life or way of thinking that's either complementary or suitable for me and my company? And so it does create an alignment. There are founders who reach out to me very specifically because of my views on certain things and they want to work with me more than other people. And if they don't, great. There's [46:42] you know, sometimes publicly that they can pair with that might be a better fit. I'm actually also on that front. I'm just like, I'm happy that the language is now just in the ecosystem is very much back to and I feel as with founders, but like founders want partners. And I felt this during that, like I really valued my board members like I and I got lucky. I have very good board members, but I really valued them. And there was that weird period where it became this sort of like feature to sort of invest without being a board member and that like companies don't need boards and all that stuff. [47:12] like at a point in their career where like you like Parker Conrad can kind of like get away with it because he's no sure you don't like people want like building companies are always a roller coaster ride and having someone who's long for the journey like just like it's a lonely job being a founder is very lonely. Yeah, totally. You know, the more you're friends with and no founders really well, you actually feel that. Yeah, I'm very close. A lot of founders I work with and I know them very well and I've worked with them for years and sometimes knowing them for like someone like Max Lovshay for 20 plus years. And so you can actually tell their emotional

[47:42] state pretty well and so having [47:45] people that understand what you're going through and occasionally can give you like feedback. Like sometimes actually it's counterintuitive feedback. Like when things are tough, encouragement might be the right answer, not criticism. And then actually the best time to be critical is actually when things are going really well. So like understanding that dynamic with the founders you work with and board members are typically really good at that. The people who say you can get the proxy for having other founders you talk to or stuff like that is they often lack context. [48:13] like context about like how the company is really doing. Who are these people that, you know, this founder is working with, you know, what's going right or wrong. And the board member has to have like some level visibility, sometimes really good visibility. So you kind of I can project, you know, sort of your emotional state and why it is what it is. Yeah, I mean, I think a lot of times there's, you know, there's a there's a misconception that like, once you have a board, you have to be like, buttoned up and you have to like share stuff in these calculated ways. And they're going to kind of be a value. And it's like, it's the opposite. Like you can be much more real with your board [48:43] members sometimes with your execs. You almost have to be. Because once you talk to some things about with an exec, all hell breaks loose. You can't ever show any doubt to an exec without people suddenly, catastrophically moving in a different direction. And a really good board member, you can have a conversation with, I'm not sure this part of our strategy is right, or this part of the team, or maybe we don't need this, maybe we don't need this team, et cetera. All of those conversations are really helpful to have someone to talk to. Some people

[49:13] Thank you. [49:14] have a co-founder at all or a great one that's on the same plane. There's just something structurally nice though about somebody who is in it with you, but also has a lot of other things they care about too. Detachment's useful sometimes. Like if something really bad is happening, even with your executive or your co-founder, it's like if you're like, "Oh my God, the sky is falling," and then you tell somebody else who's under the same building, they're like, "Oh no, the sky is falling on me too." It's just going to amplify the problem. It's just amplified. Right? Like we're actually, I think this is one of the reasons why I don't always recommend people [49:44] They're closer to being under the same sky. Well, yeah, they are because their career's at stake, right? So imagine one of my companies [49:52] that we're counting on being successful has a really severe problem. Nobody here is going to fire me if something goes wrong. So when you call me up and say, Hey, I've got this really severe problem. What do you think I should do? Like, I don't react emotionally. Cause I know I'm just like, I'm in like immediate problem solving mode. And if you call it the founders I work with, that's like, like immediately. Okay. Like what, what can we do about this? What are the options? What should we talk to? You know, et cetera, et cetera. Versus like, Oh shit. Like my partners

[50:22] mode which is very natural. I saw this play out during COVID as an illustration. I already had this view just having been an executive and having worked with people in their own career path intersection as VCs. [50:34] during COVID, [50:36] most founders were under [50:38] severe stress right away. Like, what do I do? What does it mean? How long is it going to last? Blah, blah, blah. Like, like burns out of control. If you just took the same company with senior partners at the successful MVCs and non-successful yet VCs, I think the quality of thinking [50:52] and the ability to be like a smoothing function, like a cushion, was just highly correlated with how successful is the VC. Right. Versus if they were just getting started or if they were unsure. I don't want any of my companies to fail. And I don't want any of our high profile companies to suddenly start underperforming. But if they do, you'll be okay. But if I do, all I'm going to do is try to figure out, is there a solution to this? What can we do about it? Versus worrying about having to communicate at my Monday partner meeting, like, oh my God. Because if I did [51:22] meeting and I would, the natural reaction by my partners here will be like, well, what else can we do to help? Like, you know, Keith, have you thought about this or that or talk to this person or I saw this 20 years ago and here's a possible answer versus like, oh, let's, you know, point fingers at Keith. There's nothing worse than if you're anxious as a founder, your investors getting even more anxious about the same thing is like a nightmare. No, and I hate [51:45] sometimes on boards with [51:46] VCs who do it. And I'll actually try to occasionally I'll run like kind of interference for the founder. Like of like, you know, I'll try to send them off. Like send send send put like a protective envelope around the founder. But sometimes they just ask for like a lot of data. Even that's distracting. It's like, oh my God, like my partner should ask me all these questions. Like what's going wrong? Blah blah. I'm like, the last thing you want to do is distract the founder with a bunch of data requests when they're trying to solve a key problem. But it's a natural evolution. And that said, of course,

[52:12] Every VC is a young VC at some point. And so this isn't a one size fits all. But I think you have to be judicious about board members that do amplify your own emotional state, which is not what you really want. Maybe a final topic that's... [52:26] you know, somewhat tangential to this. Yourself, you were an operator for a long time, very successful, you know, obviously Benoad was a founder of Sun Microsystems, same at Founders Fund, like they're rooted around foundorship. Also, you've built companies as you've been a VC, you know, you've opened or opened store, you know, the same thing happened with like Trey and Delia. Like it's like both of these places, like entrepreneurial investing is like sort of in the DNA. But you've also obviously worked with a lot of investors who are career investors and you've been on board with people who are both types. Like now that you've been [52:56] on lots of companies, many of which are very important. What are your reflections about this difference and how it shows up? - I think it's much better if you've built things or aspire to build things to be a VC. First of all, you just understand things at a different level, tactically, emotionally. You've just encountered problems and it's pretty native. Secondly, it gives you credibility [53:19] to, which is useful. Like, why should I believe you sort of, which is important. So you're right at KV, you know, many people here are [53:28] have built companies and want to build companies, et cetera. And we encourage it, founders fund, you know, think about the brand, you know, et cetera. And so I think that's better. Are there exceptions? There's not that many. If I think about like when I'm raising capital for my companies, like ones I've built,

[53:46] and or [53:47] or highest performing companies are asking for advice on subsequent rounds of financing, who do I naturally send them to? [53:53] it's almost always people who started their career building stuff like you know we compete but also we're friends with roll off and alford they both yeah [54:02] - They both had real jobs. - Yeah. - And they remember what it's like to have a real job. And so they're top of my list often. And so I think that is pretty critical. Are there exceptions? Honestly, since 2005, I think there was an era where you could be a professional finance person, be a successful VC. [54:21] I think Fred Wilson, Peter Fenton, that kind of era. Since 2005, I can only name, I think, one character. [54:27] good investor. [54:29] Thank you. [54:29] who started their career after 2005, who didn't actually, you know, work as an entrepreneur at some point. Who's that? [54:36] Moon. Oh, yeah. [54:37] Yeah. When he's talking, it's great. [54:39] But I don't know of anybody else that I think is exceptional that started the career after 2005. Jeremy Levine would be in the first category. He was also a great investor. He did do a startup, but like not like a high profile one. What do you think for the people? And, you know, maybe there would be some set of people who are eight or 10 or 12 years into their career who you wouldn't yet say they're Mamoon. But, you know, if you spend time with them, you'd be like, OK, they could be on track. When you think about what makes a Mamoon situation work, how do those people?

[55:09] doing VC and who never sort of built a company or whatever. What does it take for those people to get there? How does that happen? Well, I think you need to compare. Ultimately venture comes down to, and this is maybe summing up everything we've discussed, you have to have a comparative advantage. Like why me or why us or some combination? Why take my money or why take our money? And usually it's a mix of the overall brand and the individual and to match make exercise, too. [55:33] One way or the other, if you're going to be a non- [55:36] founder, non-previous executive, you have to have a really compelling answer to that. So one of the ways some people solve it in Cluma Moon is going after a vertical first, [55:45] That's not super popular. [55:47] like sass and stuff when he did box and stuff very non-consensus and so you can create credibility domain expertise etc that way so you have a really good why like okay this is why you should partner with me yeah and so if you can develop that now that's hard to do and it's almost impossible to do in hot spaces because of that but that's about the only formula i know is you bite off a vertical [56:17] There's a wave there and you can ride that wave for a long time. And then you can parlay that into maybe a broad investor. Awesome. All right. I'm going to let you go. Thank you for taking time for this. Pleasure. This was awesome. Yeah. Cool. Awesome.